1 Although not necessary for our analysis, there is another principle of statutory construction that supports it: the legislature is presumed to enact a statute with full knowledge of the state of the law and with reference to it. City of Ingleside v. Johnson, 537 S.W.2d 145, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ). What are now Finance Code, §§34.101(e)(5) and 34.101(e)(5)(h) [now §§34.101(d)(5)-(7) and (f)], were originally part of the Texas Banking Act of 1995. At the time of enactment, a portion of the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, codified as 15 U.S.C. §77r-1, provided that "securities issued or guaranteed by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Association . . ." could be purchased and held by any person or entity subject only to any restrictions with respect to such person that would apply to an investment issued or guaranteed by the United States Government, and expressly preempting any contrary state laws (subject to an opt-out provision which was not exercised). 15 U.S.C. §77r-1(a)(1) and (b). An interpretation of Finance Code [§34.101(f)] restricting an investment in FNMA preferred stock while investment in direct United States Government issues is unrestricted would consequently be subject to preemption, a result that the legislature could not have intended.